Cross-Border Digital Campaign Boosts SDF Support During Northern Syria Clashes

Amid rising tensions in northern Syria, particularly after previous agreements between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) broke down, contact areas—especially in Aleppo’s Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiya neighborhoods—experienced rapid developments that spread to larger SDF-controlled areas. These events were accompanied by mobilization rhetoric on social media, framing the situation as a struggle for survival rather than a purely political conflict.

In this context, a digital campaign emerged using hashtags supporting the SDF and criticizing the Syrian government. Activity surged during the days of the clashes, with notable linguistic diversity and a geographic reach extending beyond Syria, suggesting the campaign aimed less at local debate and more at shaping broader public perception.

To analyze the campaign, Misbar's team applied a methodology tracking engagement patterns, examining digital identity indicators of participating accounts, and mapping the most influential networks. The investigation revealed an overlap between core accounts driving the hashtags and amplification accounts focused on copying, pasting, and repeating content, as well as cross-border interaction networks that contributed to the hashtag’s wide dissemination.

Analysis Reveals Cross-Border Digital Campaign Amplifying SDF Support

The engagement curve shows that activity began to pick up on January 13, following a period of near inactivity, and continued during the days of the clashes, gradually declining after reaching a peak. This pattern—a sudden surge in engagement followed by a gradual drop—often aligns with coordinated digital campaigns promoting specific narratives.

Over the course of about a week, 2,227 accounts shared 4,897 posts linked to hashtags supporting the SDF and criticizing the Syrian government, led by the primary hashtag under investigation. Given the short timeframe, this volume reflects the capacity for rapid mobilization and calls for examining the proportion of original content versus reshared posts to determine whether few accounts produced most of the content or whether participation was genuinely widespread.

Language distribution shows a dominance of Arabic at 76%, followed by Turkish at 14%, Portuguese at 4%, and English at 3%. The prominence of Turkish as the second most-used language indicates that engagement extended into Turkish-speaking circles, which should be analyzed alongside geographic data and network patterns to assess whether the activity was organic or part of an organized amplification effort within specific communities.

Declared locations of participating accounts reveal an unexpected concentration outside Syria, with Germany accounting for 31%. Germany’s prominence is linked to its large population of residents with Turkish roots—around 3 million—as well as a significant Kurdish population from Arab countries (Syria and Iraq), estimated at approximately 1.3 million, according to research studies, though this figure is unofficial.

Following Germany, Brazil accounted for 18%, Switzerland 11%, and Turkey and the United States each 6%.

SDF and Kurdish Identity Amplified in Cross-Border Hashtag Campaign

The campaign’s hashtag map shows that its core narrative was built on a duality of defense and threat. The hashtag #SDF dominated as a unifying label, paired with cross-border solidarity tags such as #DefendRojava, #WeAreSDF, and #We_Are_All_SDF, portraying the Syrian Democratic Forces as a “proxy fighting force” for a wider audience rather than merely a local actor.

At the same time, clear accusations targeted Turkey and President Erdoğan through hashtags like #StopTurkishTerrorism, alongside tags highlighting the killing of Kurds. This shifted the clashes from a localized military event to a broader narrative of ethnic persecution and the need for protection. The campaign also prominently featured Kurdish identity terms such as “Kurdistan,” “Rojava,” and “independence,” reflecting an effort to frame the conflict as one of identity and rights, rather than solely a temporary military confrontation.

Key Accounts Drive Early Spread of SDF Hashtag Across Kurdish Networks

The analysis of the account network shows an overlap between multiple interaction circles that promoted the hashtag in support of the SDF, including Israeli accounts and others linked to pro-SDF networks. Israeli activist Edy Cohen’s account on X was among the first to use the hashtag, receiving high engagement that helped amplify it early on, before pro-SDF accounts expanded its reach more broadly.

Further analysis shows the influence of earlier interactions within established Kurdish networks, suggesting the hashtag leveraged preexisting connections rather than emerging solely from this campaign. Its circulation continued even after the agreement was signed, reflecting its evolution from a short-term reaction into a sustained mobilization tool.

Kurdish Accounts

Analysis of the interaction network reveals a group of anonymous Kurdish accounts that played a central role in promoting the hashtag, repeatedly sharing its content during the peak of engagement and sustaining promotion afterward.

• Ezdi

An anonymous Kurdish account that reposted the hashtag dozens of times, including posts dated January 14. Its posts continued to be amplified through resharing and engagement even after the campaign’s peak. Account data on X does not provide a specific location, though general indicators suggest it is managed from Europe.

• Judy Berxwedan

An anonymous Kurdish account that actively shared the hashtag within discourse supporting the SDF and criticizing the Syrian government. Engagement with its posts persisted within a network of connected accounts. The account does not specify a location, though general indicators point to a European connection.

• Bewar

An anonymous Kurdish account promoted the hashtag through posts supporting the SDF and is part of a group of accounts that helped maintain the campaign’s momentum through repeated sharing and resharing.

Coordinated Accounts and Bots

Analysis of a sample of accounts—highlighted in green within the network—revealed a distinct participation pattern. Their activity was largely limited to repeating hashtags in replies rather than producing original content, serving to boost the visibility and reach of the hashtag within the discussion.

A closer examination of this group’s characteristics showed recurring traits indicative of coordinated amplification. These include a spam-like commenting pattern to repeatedly post the hashtag, lack of a clear personal identity, signs that the accounts are managed from outside Syria, and a limited follower base—761 accounts with fewer than 50 followers participated in promoting the hashtag.

Taken together, these indicators suggest unnatural amplification. Examples of such accounts include Afrin (@HassanKenyo), Heem Heemo (@HeemHeemo115594), and Arslan Ibrahim (@ArslanI70).

By examining online activity and discourse related to the clashes, Misbar identified the following patterns:

• The digital campaign gained momentum on January 13 after a period of minimal activity, quickly reaching its peak before gradually declining, while circulation continued throughout the days of the clashes.
• Over the course of about a week, 2,227 accounts shared 4,897 posts, reflecting the ability to mobilize quickly within a limited timeframe.
• Arabic dominated interactions at 76%, followed by Turkish at 14%, suggesting that the discussion extended beyond Arabic-speaking circles.
• Among declared account locations, Germany led at 31%, followed by Brazil at 18% and Switzerland at 11%.
• The narrative centered on defending Rojava and expressing solidarity with the Syrian Democratic Forces, countered by accusations targeting Turkey and President Erdoğan. This framing shifted the event from a localized clash to a broader discourse on identity and rights.
• Network analysis showed overlap between key accounts that promoted the hashtag early and supportive accounts that continued its dissemination, with traces of prior engagement within preexisting Kurdish networks.
• The sample also identified a group of accounts exhibiting amplification behavior, focused on replies and repeated hashtag use, with limited followers and no clear personal identity. These patterns support the hypothesis of non-organic amplification, though additional evidence is needed for confirmation.

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