Iran’s Minab School Massacre: Digital Campaign Targets Tehran

After the attack on Shajarat Tayyiba Elementary School for Girls in Minab, Iran, which killed more than 160 students, a surge of online accounts and digital committees began spreading an alternative narrative blaming the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. The claims suggested that an Iranian missile had missed its target or that the school was within a military zone. Misbar, however, investigated and debunked these narratives, confirming their inaccuracy through on-the-ground and military verification.

As part of its digital monitoring, Misbar’s team analyzed engagement patterns, networks, accounts, languages, and the most widely shared narratives to understand how public discussion around the attack was shaped and to identify key trends in the spread of these claims across digital platforms.

Interaction Patterns

Analysis of interactions and the most frequently used keywords shows that claims linking the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to the attack on Shajarat Tayyiba School began circulating on the first day of the incident. The first surge occurred on February 28, followed by a second spike at the end of March 1, and a third peak on March 3.

The timing of these peaks suggests the narrative’s spread was not spontaneous. Instead, it followed a coordinated pattern, reflecting organized activity by online networks that recycled the claims and amplified their presence in public discourse.

Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Targeted in Digital Campaign

In just four days, these networks published roughly 386,000 posts aiming to blame the Iranian regime, represented by the Revolutionary Guard, and promote claims suggesting its presence within civilian institutions, thereby attempting to justify attacks on them.

More than 209,000 accounts participated in amplifying these narratives, highlighting the scale of the campaign and the intensity of its coordinated engagement.

Analysis of the accounts involved reveals the groups driving the promotion. They were largely divided between Iranian opposition accounts with a royalist orientation—often displaying pre-revolutionary Iranian flags, crowns, and slogans such as “Javid Shah,” “#KingRezaPahlavi,” and “Free Iran”—and far-right Western accounts, primarily from the United States and the United Kingdom, featuring symbols like the American and British flags and slogans such as “MAGA” and the cross.

This overlap of identities supports the view of a coordinated propaganda effort among diverse actors promoting the same narrative.

The mixed identities also explain the campaign’s language use. Despite the presence of Iranian royalist accounts, Persian was largely absent, while English dominated as the primary language.

This indicates that the campaign’s main target audience was not domestic Iranian users but Western audiences, with the goal of tarnishing the Iranian regime’s image and providing propaganda cover for attacks against it.

Geographic distribution of the accounts reinforces these findings. The United States accounted for 57% of participation, followed by Canada at 11% and the United Kingdom at 10%. This pattern reflects a clear focus on networks involving Iranian opposition communities and far-right Western groups, explaining both the nature of the messages and the paths through which they spread.

Coordinated Narrative Links Iran’s Revolutionary Guard to Minab School Attack

Analysis of the most frequently used keywords shows that the campaign centered on linking the school attack to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) and the “Iranian regime,” repeatedly using terms such as “school,” “bombing,” and “destruction” to direct the narrative toward holding Tehran directly responsible.

The effort went beyond general accusations, forming a cohesive narrative that online networks reproduced in multiple variations while preserving the core message.

Narrative mapping indicates that the most repeated claims accused the Revolutionary Guard—citing false or misleading “evidence”—of orchestrating the school attack.

Other circulated claims alleged that the Revolutionary Guard used civilians as human shields, deliberately positioned itself inside schools and other civilian facilities, and converted these sites into military bases or positions.

In addition, a narrative emerged suggesting that the school was struck by an IRGC missile by mistake, attempting to advance a “self-responsibility” theory and shift blame away from the actual perpetrators.

Key Accounts

Analysis of the interaction network reveals that the narrative’s promotion was divided into two main groups. The first consisted of Iranian opposition activists’ accounts, which were among the earliest to circulate claims blaming the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) for the school attack. The second group comprised Israeli accounts that quickly picked up these claims, amplifying them through networked committees and expanding their reach, which helped boost the narrative across digital platforms.

Among the leading Israeli accounts was Nioh Berg, an activist of Iranian descent who campaigns against the Iranian regime and supports demonstrations calling for its overthrow and the restoration of the monarchy under Reza Pahlavi. She posted several widely engaged tweets promoting claims that held the Iranian regime responsible for the school attack.

Emily Schrader, an Israeli media figure focused on Iranian affairs, was also prominent in promoting the narrative, posting claims that the school was adjacent to or inside a military complex in an attempt to justify the attack.

Eyal Yakoby, an Israeli activist based in the United States, previously known for opposing pro-Palestinian student demonstrations at U.S. universities, similarly helped circulate claims accusing the Revolutionary Guard of responsibility for the school attack.

Other Israeli accounts involved included Liza Rosen, an anonymous account that gained prominence during the Israeli war on Gaza and resurfaced to recycle and widely spread the campaign’s claims, and Eli David, an Israeli activist based in the U.S. and a key figure in promoting Israeli narratives and leading online committees, whose posts reached a broad audience.

On the Iranian royalist side, several accounts played a pivotal role in launching and driving the narrative. Among them was Neo, an anonymous Persian-oriented account identifying as atheist, known for actively following developments in Iran and inciting opposition to the regime. The account posted a widely shared claim alleging that the Revolutionary Guard uses children as human shields.

Goldie Ghamari | گلسا قمری, an Iranian-origin activist based in Canada and a member of the Ontario parliament, also promoted the same claims, which were later amplified by online committees.

The account Throwback Iran, a news account with an Iranian identity reportedly operated from the United States, showed a clear bias against the ruling regime and was among the primary accounts circulating the claims, which were then widely reshared by committees.

Sana Ebrahimi, an Iranian activist based in the United States known for her intensive anti-regime activity on social media, also supported the narrative, attributing responsibility for the school attack to the Revolutionary Guard.

The overlap between Iranian opposition and Israeli accounts indicates that the narrative did not spread organically. Instead, it circulated through an interconnected network of actors who coordinated roles—initially launching the claims, then recycling, amplifying, and extending their reach to a broader audience.

Suspicious Accounts

Analysis of the participating accounts, based on follower counts, reveals a substantial presence of accounts exhibiting characteristics of coordinated online committees, clearly amplifying engagement through repeated resharing. Nearly 50,000 accounts—about a quarter of all accounts involved in circulating the claims—had fewer than 100 followers, supporting the conclusion that much of the activity was organized rather than purely organic.

Examination of account creation dates shows a sharp increase in new accounts coinciding with rising U.S. and Israeli threats against Iran. The creation curve shows a notable spike from the beginning of the year, with over 1,100 newly registered accounts.

A similar surge was observed during the Twelve-Day War in June 2025, indicating a recurring pattern of activating or creating accounts during periods of political and military escalation.

These accounts share several defining traits. First, they are largely anonymous, providing little or no identifiable information about their operators and often displaying Iranian royalist symbols, such as the pre-revolutionary flag or monarchy-related emblems.

Second, they have limited followings, with many under 100 followers, which contrasts sharply with the high engagement their posts generate or amplify.

Third, their behavior is primarily focused on amplification, resembling “spam,” with repeated retweets and reposts aimed at boosting the narrative’s visibility and reach across platforms.

Together, these indicators suggest that a significant portion of the engagement was not driven solely by genuine users endorsing the narrative but by a network of accounts seemingly created specifically to digitally amplify and push the narrative into prominence.

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