Following El Fasher’s Path: How Are the Foundations of Life Eroding in El Obeid?

In El Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan state, the humanitarian crisis is no longer merely a set of figures in international organizations’ reports. Satellite imagery reveals damage to fuel and power facilities, health care facilities and other civilian infrastructure, alongside the expansion of displacement sites and the emergence of long lines outside fuel stations that remain operational.

These scenes paint a picture of a city where the basic foundations of survival are gradually eroding amid military strikes, power outages, and shortages of fuel and water.

The crisis in El Obeid comes against the backdrop of a war that has driven Sudan into what the United Nations describes as the world’s largest humanitarian crisis. About 34 million people need humanitarian assistance, while millions of Sudanese face acute levels of food insecurity.

The war has also forced about 13 million people to flee their homes, including internally displaced people and refugees who have crossed international borders, amid a widespread deterioration in health and humanitarian services.

In July, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk warned that a new humanitarian catastrophe was unfolding in El Obeid, saying residents had lived under conditions resembling a siege for the past 18 months and had been subjected to repeated drone strikes, as fighting intensified between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces around the city.

The Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights documented 15 drone attacks on El Obeid and its surrounding areas between June 6 and 28, killing at least 45 civilians and injuring 41 others. Strikes attributed by U.N. and local sources to the Rapid Support Forces also hit vital service facilities, worsening fuel, water and electricity shortages and weakening hospitals’ and public facilities’ ability to continue operating.

In this report, the Misbar team at Alaraby Television relies on satellite imagery analysis, video footage, U.N. reports and open-source material to track damage to fuel stations, the main power station, medical facilities, markets, and government and media offices. The report also examines the relationship between damage to these facilities and civilians’ declining ability to remain in the city, as displacement sites expand and humanitarian needs worsen.

Satellite imagery alone does not establish that forcing residents to flee was a direct objective of the strikes. However, it reveals a pattern of damage that narrows civilians’ options and makes remaining in El Obeid increasingly difficult and dangerous.

El Obeid Under Fire

El Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan state, lies at the intersection of major roads connecting central Sudan with the country’s west and south. The city serves as a major transportation hub linking Kosti with the Darfur region and is also connected to Khartoum through several routes. Its location has given it significant military and logistical importance, making it one of the main areas of competition between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces.

On Feb. 23, 2025, the Sudanese army announced that it had broken the siege of El Obeid after the “Hunter Mobile Force” reached the city and linked up with troops from the Fifth Infantry Division. The move ended a siege imposed by the Rapid Support Forces since the outbreak of the war in April 2023 and reopened one of the city’s main supply routes.

But the lifting of the siege did not end the threats facing the city. During the first months of 2026, the Rapid Support Forces intensified drone attacks on El Obeid and its surrounding areas, while pressure continued on supply routes and essential services.

The United Nations estimates that about 500,000 civilians inside El Obeid are at risk, as strikes and shelling have damaged civilian infrastructure, disrupted supply routes and threatened the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

According to a report by the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab, open-source reports indicate that Rapid Support Forces units are positioned west, north and south of El Obeid. However, the lab said it was unable to independently verify the locations or size of these forces, nor did it identify sufficient indicators to conclude that the city was close to falling. Meanwhile, the Sudanese Armed Forces continue to hold some eastern supply routes toward Kosti, despite sustained pressure.

A field-monitoring map published by Vista Maps also corresponds with the general picture of troop positions around El Obeid, showing Rapid Support Forces positions north and west of the city, while the Sudanese army continues to control the city and its eastern approaches.

Google Earth imagery dated April 6, 2026, shows an extensive network of defensive fortifications around El Obeid, consisting of trenches and earth berms stretching around much of the city’s perimeter. Heavy engineering equipment can also be seen near parts of the trench system, potentially indicating that excavation, deepening or reinforcement work was still underway when the imagery was captured.

According to measurements conducted by the report’s team using Google Earth tools, the trench and berm system extends for more than 50 kilometers. This measurement corresponds with an estimate by Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab, which placed the length of the fortification network at about 51 kilometers and said its nature and distribution are consistent with a defensive posture prepared by the army to confront a multi-directional siege or an attempt to storm the city.

Although this picture raises concerns about the repetition of some of the siege patterns seen in El Fasher, particularly the encirclement of the city and attacks on supply routes and infrastructure, the available evidence is insufficient to conclude that conditions in El Obeid mirror those in El Fasher. The Yale Humanitarian Research Lab itself emphasized that, as of the date of its report, there were no indications that the same conditions associated with mass killings in El Fasher were present.

Targeting Civilian Infrastructure

Satellite imagery available through Google Earth reveals some of the damage inflicted on civilian infrastructure in El Obeid, amid escalating drone strikes and worsening electricity, fuel, water and health care crises.

Images dated April 6, 2026, show clear damage to the El Obeid Legislative Council building, including two large impact sites on the roof. A comparison of Copernicus imagery captured between Jan. 14 and 24, 2026, also reveals new damage that appeared during that period at the building, located at coordinates [13.1783, 30.21983].

Damage to Health Facilities and a Medical Supply Warehouse

Health care facilities were not spared. In a report issued June 29, 2026, the Yale School of Public Health’s Humanitarian Research Lab documented damage to a building inside El Obeid Hospital, believed to house the ophthalmology department, between Feb. 19 and March 4, 2026.

The lab’s analysis also showed the destruction of several buildings near the British Hospital and Kordofan Multispecialty Clinic during the same period. It further documented damage caused by several impact sites at a facility believed to be a medical supply warehouse inside the city.

In an independent analysis of imagery captured between Feb. 13 and March 20, 2026, the Misbar team identified at least two openings in the roof of the main building of the medical supply warehouse, indicating that it was hit multiple times.

Google Earth imagery dated April 6 shows the extent of the damage to the warehouse structure, located south of the city at coordinates [13.1284, 30.215109].

On June 18, 2026, Sudanese media reported that the El Obeid substation had been targeted in an attack attributed by local media and sources to the Rapid Support Forces. The strike hit one of the station’s transformers and, according to local reports, knocked the facility out of service, cutting electricity to the city.

Misbar's team compared footage recorded inside the station after the attack with earlier images of the site and identified significant damage to two main transformers at the station, located southeast of the city at coordinates [13.136757, 30.283130].

Satellite imagery also shows evidence of new damage at the site between May 19 and June 28, 2026. These findings correspond with the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab’s analysis, which identified damage to the station between May 23 and June 25 and said this strengthened open-source reports that the station had been targeted by a drone on June 18.

11 Fuel Stations Damaged in Four Months

A report by Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab reveals a recurring pattern of strikes hitting fuel stations across different parts of El Obeid. The lab concluded that eight stations sustained damage consistent with aerial bombardment during a single month, between May 25 and June 25, 2026.

Expanding the timeframe, the lab identified damage at least 11 fuel stations between Feb. 19 and June 25, 2026. It concluded that the damage to these stations contributed to worsening fuel and electricity shortages, reduced residents’ ability to use vehicles to leave the city, and affected the operation of hospitals, water pumps, and the transportation of goods and humanitarian aid.

A map prepared by Misbar's team shows that the damaged stations are distributed across several parts of the city, indicating that the damage was not concentrated in a single neighborhood or limited to one geographic axis.

Among the stations identified by Misbar's team is Qadira Petroleum, located in the center of the city at coordinates [13.17444, 30.21329]. 

A comparison of images from May 25 and June 25, 2026, shows new damage to the station and some of its facilities extending along both sides of the road.

The latest Google Earth imagery also shows extensive damage to Al Wataniya Petroleum station. According to the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab’s analysis, the damage appeared between March 4 and 17, 2026.

During the same period, Al Muqran station, located west of the city on the B26 road, sustained extensive damage. Images show that most of the station’s facilities were destroyed, while the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab estimates that the damage occurred between March 4 and 17, 2026.

Long Lines Outside Remaining Fuel Stations

The damage to a large number of fuel stations coincided with the emergence of long lines of vehicles outside stations that continued to operate. Satellite imagery provides a visual indicator of the pressure on fuel supplies, but alone cannot determine the causes of each queue or measure the actual extent of the market shortage.

The Misbar team analyzed imagery captured outside Al Asfiya Fuel Station, located at coordinates [13.180067, 30.18192], showing a line of vehicles extending along the road for approximately 550 meters.

Other images show groups of vehicles and people forming queues stretching hundreds of meters near Talat Station, located at coordinates [13.15341, 30.2118198].

These scenes are consistent with findings in a report by Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab, which identified long lines outside apparently operational fuel stations in images from June 25 that were not visible in images captured May 25. The report also cited local sources as saying that the fuel crisis had led to the shutdown of some water facilities and the closure of emergency departments and a dialysis center due to shortages of power and supplies.

The impact of this damage extends beyond vehicle movement. Parts of the water network and health care infrastructure depend on electricity or fuel to operate pumps and generators. As a result, damage to power and fuel facilities coincided with electricity outages and water shortages, reducing the ability of several health and service facilities to continue providing essential services.

Displacement Sites Expand Under the Weight of Escalation

The International Organization for Migration has warned of a rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation in the Kordofan region. According to its data, the number of newly displaced people since the escalation began in October 2025 increased by 65%, from more than 132,000 people in February 2026 to more than 219,000 by late June.

The organization also recorded more than 100 incidents that caused displacement in less than nine months, at an average of roughly one major incident every two to three days.

These figures are consistent with the findings of satellite imagery analysis. Misbar's team identified an increase in the number of temporary structures inside one displacement site in El Obeid by comparing images captured April 6 and Aug. 4, 2026.

In a subsequent analysis, the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab documented an increase of more than 700 temporary structures inside displacement sites in El Obeid over a single month. The largest increase occurred at the main site in the center of the city, where at least 694 temporary structures were added between May 25 and June 25, 2026, alongside an expansion of another site east of the city.

These structures do not necessarily represent 700 households or occupied tents, nor can satellite imagery alone be used to estimate the number of people living inside them. The Yale Humanitarian Research Lab explained that, based solely on the available imagery, it could not determine the total number of displaced people or measure the rate at which their numbers were increasing.

Misbar's team believes the site where the expansion was observed corresponds to the Tajat site for internally displaced people, based on an information sheet issued by Sudan’s Site Management Cluster and published through the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ ReliefWeb platform on May 18, 2026. The document indicates that the site began receiving displaced people following waves of military escalation since late 2023. However, this identification requires further confirmation through coordinates or field data.

The document estimates that about 38,580 displaced people live at the site, including 20,447 children, 1,543 older people and 5,787 people with disabilities.

These figures do not necessarily represent mutually exclusive categories, as one person may belong to more than one group. However, they reflect the high proportion of people particularly vulnerable to risks at the site amid deteriorating services and continued escalation around the city.

Calls to Leave El Obeid Amid Escalating Attacks and Disrupted Supplies

By late June and early July, accounts linked to the Rapid Support Forces began publishing messages urging residents of El Obeid to leave the city, ostensibly to preserve their lives, amid growing concerns over a possible ground assault. On June 29, the so-called parallel “Government of Peace,” which emerged from the “Tasis” alliance aligned with the Rapid Support Forces, called for the opening of safe corridors allowing civilians wishing to leave El Obeid to reach safer areas. It also announced its readiness to coordinate with international and regional partners to facilitate the departure of civilians and the delivery of humanitarian aid.

These calls coincided with an escalation in attacks targeting supply routes leading to El Obeid. In February, the United Nations condemned a drone attack targeting trucks contracted by the World Food Programme that were traveling from Kosti to displaced families near El Obeid. The attack killed one person, burned trucks and destroyed food aid.

The Emergency Lawyers group accused the Rapid Support Forces of carrying out the attack, while the United Nations did not identify those responsible in its statement.

On June 27, the Sudanese Humanitarian Aid Commission accused the Rapid Support Forces of targeting a truck carrying about 50 tons of flour near the city of Al Rahad as it traveled toward El Obeid. The attack killed the driver, injured his companions and damaged most of the cargo.

The commission also accused the forces of attacking aid convoys and commercial vehicles along the national highway linking White Nile and North Kordofan states. However, as of the date this report was prepared, these allegations had not been independently investigated in every incident.

In July, the Rapid Support Forces intensified drone attacks on the city and its surrounding areas, while aid convoys and supply routes were repeatedly targeted.

Media reports also documented strikes on the national highway linking White Nile and North Kordofan states, destroying trucks carrying humanitarian aid to displaced people near El Obeid.

The head of the International Organization for Migration’s mission in Sudan, Mohamed Refaat, warned that El Obeid could face a fate similar to El Fasher unless urgent action was taken to protect civilians and ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid. He said more than 500,000 people inside the city needed assistance, warning that the continuation of the siege and disruption of supplies could push the crisis to catastrophic levels. According to the published statements, Refaat did not say that the displacement of residents was an announced or established objective of the Rapid Support Forces’ strategy.

The calls to leave the city coincided with the Rapid Support Forces’ official Telegram account publishing footage showing military units moving toward El Obeid, including a force commanded by Gen. Habib Harika, which the account described as preparing to “liberate El Obeid.” The account also announced that another group was approaching the city as part of what it described as “hundreds of mobile forces.”

Amid damaged fuel stations, power outages, disrupted health and water facilities, and expanding displacement sites, the visual evidence shows that the danger in El Obeid extends beyond the possibility of its capture. It also encompasses the gradual erosion of the basic conditions necessary for life inside the city.

The available evidence does not establish the existence of an announced policy to forcibly displace residents. However, it shows how civilians’ options are narrowing between remaining in a city where services are deteriorating and leaving via roads that are themselves coming under attack.

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