After Houthi Ban, Misbar Tracks Contraction in Yanbu Port Traffic and Alternative Routes for Saudi Crude

Yanbu Industrial Port recorded a sharp decline in vessel traffic following the Houthi group’s announcement on July 20, 2026, that it was imposing a maritime ban on vessels linked to Saudi Arabia.

According to an analysis conducted by Misbar’s team at Alaraby Television using MarineTraffic data, total port calls — the combined number of arrivals and departures — fell by about 89% compared with the period preceding the announcement.

The port did not come to a complete standstill, however. The data show a broad contraction in vessel traffic, affecting both arrivals and departures, alongside changes in the number of vessels that continued to use the port and the length of time they remained there.

In this report, Misbar’s team tracks changes in Yanbu Port activity following the Houthi announcement before examining tanker activity outside the port and whether the available data indicate that some Saudi shipments were rerouted through alternative routes, ports, and oil pipelines.

What Does MarineTraffic Data Show?

Misbar’s team collected and extracted vessel-traffic data provided by MarineTraffic for Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu Industrial Port and compared two periods.

The first period covered the 61 days preceding the Houthi group’s announcement that it was imposing a maritime ban on vessels linked to Saudi Arabia from the Red Sea, from May 20 to July 19, 2026. The second period began on July 20 and continued through September 9, 2026, with the aim of measuring changes in port activity following the announcement.

Details of the data used in the comparison are available in the datasets for Yanbu Port activity after the announcement and Yanbu Port activity before the announcement.

Analyzing the Impact of the Houthi Blockade on Yanbu Industrial Port Activity

Vessel-tracking data reveal a sharp decline in maritime activity at Yanbu Industrial Port after the Houthi group announced the maritime ban. During the period preceding the announcement, from May 20 to July 19, 1,962 port calls, including arrivals and departures, were recorded over 61 days.

In the subsequent 52-day period, the number fell to just 223 port calls. The daily average declined from 32.2 calls to 4.3, representing an 86.7% decrease.

The decline is not limited to the number of vessels arriving at the port; it also extends to departures. Average daily arrivals fell from 13.3 to two vessels, a decrease of 85.2%, while average daily departures declined from 18.8 to 2.3 vessels, a decrease of 87.7%.

The simultaneous contraction in both indicators suggests that the decline affected the entire maritime traffic cycle, rather than merely the number of vessels heading to Yanbu. Both inbound and outbound traffic declined at the same time, reflecting a broad reduction in the pace of operations during the subsequent period.

Fewer Vessels, Longer Dwell Times

The number of individual vessels calling at Yanbu Port fell from 304 before the announcement to 80 afterward, a decline of 73.7%. The average number of unique vessels per day also fell from five to 1.5.

This means the contraction was not limited to a decline in the number of port calls, but also affected the number of vessels that continued to use the port during the subsequent period. Nevertheless, the ratio of loaded to empty vessels remained relatively stable, at approximately 54% to 55% during the two periods.

This finding indicates that the primary change occurred in the volume of traffic, rather than in the proportional distribution between loaded vessels and vessels operating in ballast. This ratio alone is insufficient to determine the size or value of shipments, but it helps describe the nature of the change in port activity.

By contrast, average vessel dwell time inside the port increased from 43.3 hours before the announcement to 104.8 hours afterward, an increase of 142.2%. The median also rose from 24.4 to 36.7 hours, an increase of 50.1%.

The simultaneous increase in both the mean and median suggests that the longer dwell times were not attributable solely to a single exceptional case, although the mean remained more susceptible to voyages involving particularly long stays. One case lasted nearly 1,410 hours, providing a notable indication of the increase in time spent inside the port.

How Did the Houthi Ban Disrupt Maritime Traffic?

On July 20, 2026, the Houthi group announced what it described as a maritime ban on vessels linked to Saudi Arabia, while the Saudi-led coalition announced measures to protect commercial vessels transiting the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

One day after the announcement, Reuters detected changes in the routes of three tankers carrying Saudi crude: Xin Long Yang, Rodos, and Amazon. Instead of continuing southward through Bab el-Mandeb, the tankers headed north toward the Suez Canal.

Route Changes

A subsequent Reuters report found that the tankers Amazon and Rodos switched off their Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals on July 22 while approaching Bab el-Mandeb. Amazon was carrying about one million barrels of Saudi crude for Indian Oil, while Rodos was carrying approximately 700,000 barrels for the Mangalore refinery in India.

Switching off AIS alone does not establish that the two tankers were attempting to conceal their movements from the Houthi group. However, it occurred alongside the maritime warning and changes in the routes of other tankers, making it an indicator of increased operational and security risks associated with voyages departing from Yanbu.

This coincided with heightened security warnings and increased war-risk insurance costs, prompting companies and entities operating in the maritime sector to tighten their procedures when handling vessels linked to Saudi ports on the Red Sea.

On July 23, Saudi Arabia’s Transport General Authority announced that the Saudi-flagged tanker ENCELIA had come under attack in the Red Sea, reporting that the vessel’s bow caught fire and that all crew members were safe. The following day, the authority announced that the tanker NCC MASA had sustained minor damage to its hull and continued sailing after the safety of the crew and vessel had been confirmed.

On August 24, Bahri reported that the giant tanker Amzan had been involved in a security incident west of Yanbu, approximately 63 nautical miles away, with no injuries reported among the crew, according to Okaz newspaper. The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) also issued a warning regarding the incident.

Decline in Transit

Tanker-traffic indicators are consistent with crude-flow data. Kpler data showed that the average volume of Saudi crude transiting Bab el-Mandeb exceeded 3.5 million barrels per day in early July before approaching zero during August.

The same data indicate increased use of the alternative route through the Suez Canal and the SUMED pipeline, reaching Sidi Kerir.

On August 12, Reuters reported differing estimates from specialized tracking companies. Vortexa estimated average Yanbu loadings at approximately 2.38 million barrels per day, compared with 2.71 million barrels during the preceding period, while Kpler estimated a decline from 4.04 million to 1.78 million barrels per day. AXSMarine provided a different estimate of approximately 850,000 barrels per day.

These figures cannot be combined into a single average because the companies use different monitoring methodologies, definitions of loadings, and time periods. However, they point to a common trend: a clear decline in the pace of crude exports from Yanbu during the period following the Houthi announcement.

A Bloomberg report on September 2 also indicated that average Yanbu exports had fallen to approximately 2.25 million barrels per day, compared with 3.7 million barrels in July, a decline of about 39%.

Taken together, these findings indicate that the Houthi threat did not necessarily halt exports from Yanbu, but increased the cost and risks associated with the southern route, prompting some shipments to shift to longer and more complex alternative routes.

Alternative Routes, Not a Single Replacement

Data on the stated destinations of vessels departing Yanbu Port do not indicate that one maritime route was simply replaced by another. Rather, they reveal a shift in the distribution of voyages following the announcement of the ban. Before the announcement, voyages between Saudi ports accounted for approximately 44% of destinations, while Egypt accounted for about 5%.

After the announcement, Egypt’s share rose to approximately 13.5% of all stated destinations, alongside a decline in the relative share of other destinations, including Singapore, Malaysia, and India. This may reflect the redirection of part of the shipping activity toward Egypt and the Suez Canal.

Kpler data indicate that Saudi flows to Egypt’s Ain Sokhna port rose to approximately 1.32 million barrels per day in July, compared with 770,000 barrels per day in June.

Meanwhile, crude shipments departing from Sidi Kerir reached a record level of approximately 2.4 million barrels per day during the first week of August, compared with an average of 1.3 million barrels per day in July. These figures measure crude flows and loadings rather than vessel movements inside the port, and reflect increased use of Egyptian infrastructure as an alternative to the southern route through Bab el-Mandeb.

MarineTraffic data provide field-level indicators of this route. The tankers ROBERTA B and KENYA B were observed traveling from Yanbu Port toward Ain Sokhna.

This movement is consistent with a mechanism in which crude is transported from the Red Sea coast to Ain Sokhna and then pumped through the Suez-Mediterranean pipeline, known as SUMED, to Sidi Kerir on the Mediterranean coast.

How Does the Route Work?

The voyage of the tanker Front Empire illustrates how this route works in practice. According to Kpler, the tanker departed Al Maqta terminal carrying approximately 1.2 million barrels of Saudi crude on July 25. It then transited the Suez Canal and received approximately 800,000 additional barrels at Sidi Kerir on August 6 before continuing toward South and Central Asia.

This process does not necessarily mean that the same shipment was transferred from one vessel to another. Rather, it demonstrates the possibility of combining quantities loaded at two different terminals before continuing the voyage to the final market. Kpler’s analysis also suggests that India may have been one of the shipment’s destinations.

The diversion significantly extended the voyage, which took approximately 40 days, compared with about eight days for the usual route from Yanbu to India’s western coast.

The Egyptian route therefore provides a practical alternative for maintaining crude flows, but it entails higher time and logistical costs, reducing tanker turnaround efficiency and the ports’ ability to carry out successive loading operations.

Rerouting extends beyond vessel movements to the way cargoes themselves are offered. On July 23, Reuters quoted five trading sources as saying that Saudi Aramco had offered additional cargoes for spot loading from Sidi Kerir, alongside previously contracted supplies.

This move indicates an effort to increase export flexibility and reach European and U.S. markets from the northern end of the Suez Canal rather than relying entirely on southern voyages through Bab el-Mandeb. However, it does not by itself establish the volume of shipments that were rerouted or whether they fully offset the decline in Yanbu exports.

MarineTraffic data also show tankers heading to Sidi Kerir along maritime routes that avoid Bab el-Mandeb, including AMAD and SHADEN, which were observed sailing from East Asia toward the Egyptian port via the route around Africa. The same pattern appears in other voyages, but AIS data alone are insufficient to establish that these tankers were carrying Saudi crude or that their cargoes originated in Yanbu.

Taken together, the available evidence indicates that Saudi Arabia’s response to Red Sea risks has taken the form of a multi-route network: moving crude northward through Ain Sokhna and SUMED to Sidi Kerir, increasing loading offers from the Egyptian port, and using longer maritime routes that avoid Bab el-Mandeb. This diversification has helped keep exports possible, but it has not eliminated the impact of the risks. Instead, it has shifted part of the cost to voyage time, route length, operational efficiency, and insurance expenses.

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